This definition is general regarding the form but specific and narrow regarding the purpose of the "partnership," with the purpose being limited to the private provision of public goods. Savas (2000) similarly emphasizes the private provision of public services. Vogel (2000) presents a legal analysis of the opposite-the public provision of private goods. He also provides a large number of examples of public-private interaction in the provision of both public and private goods. His work illustrates that the line that separates public sector from private sector roles is fuzzy and changeable. The lack of an agreed-upon vocabulary for describing different cooperative efforts is also evidenced by the absence of clear definitions for terms such as alliance, coalition, association, and so forth.
As planners articulate their activities with economic development initiatives, there is a need to categorize the types of PPC to understand how form, function, and outcomes are related. Although economic development activities are the basis for many of our illustrative cases, the conceptual framework is broadly applicable to other situations where planners may work with the private and public sectors to achieve complementary goals. The general purpose of this article is to provide a vocabulary for the study of cooperation between the public and the private for-profit sectors.
The examples focus on economic development for two reasons. First, the need for analysis is greater because of the relatively recent growth of states collaborating with private industry to promote economic development (Isserman, 1994; Walzer & Jacobs, 1998; Weaver & Dennert, 1987) . Second, the potential for significant conflicts of interest in economic development is great (Reese & Rosenfeld, 2001) . For example, a government that enters into a PPC with a private firm and makes a significant financial investment (or invests significant political capital) may be reluctant to pursue susThis content downloaded from 157.182.147.226 on Thu, 18 Oct 2018 18:49:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms pected violations of rules and regulations by its private "partner" if this would endanger the success of the cooperative project. In other words, the government may lose, or be perceived of having lost, its impartiality when it assumes a large tangible interest in the success of private projects. PPC may also affect interfirm competition. When, in 1991, the city of Denver offered substantial financial incentives to United Airlines to locate its maintenance facility at the new Denver International Airport, Continental
Airlines was quick to request similar concessions for its already existing facility, on the basis of competitive fairness. (United Airlines ended up locating its facility elsewhere.) For another critical perspective on conflicts of interest, consult Cummings, Koebel, and Whitt (1989) . Finally, close cooperation between the public and the private sectors in economic development could lead to inequitable outcomes (e.g., Krumholz, 1999) .
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section identifies dimensions of PPC participant interest that are helpful in understanding potential outcomes of cooperation. Then, we present a discussion of differences when the cooperation is between the public sector and the private sector as opposed to private-private or publicpublic cooperation. An inventory of forms of PPC follows. We then note special differences encountered when the cooperator is a nonprofit. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.
Critical Dimensions for the Analysis of Cooperative Efforts
Our analysis is limited to voluntary cooperation. A necessary condition for the existence of voluntary cooperative agreements is that all participants expect to end up better off than they would have if they were acting alone. This can happen only if the correlation between the expected rewards of the participants is positive. Rewards can be both tangible and intangible (values, beliefs, relationships) . Gray (1985) , in an influential article, refers to interdependencies among stakeholders.
Cooperation makes participants better off if (a) by pooling their resources, they obtain efficiencies; or (b) by combining complementary strengths, they can increase the scope of their activities; and/or (c) cooperation reinforces the mission or satisfies values or beliefs. The intent to cooperate does not guarantee success, however. The likelihood of success depends on how well participants coordinate their decisions and actions. Decisions can also be "directively correlated," that is, directed toward common values or ideals but without coordination of specific actions-such that the cooperating parties move together toward achieving the same purpose or mission. One of the benefits of voluntary cooperation is that each participant gains some measure of influence over the decisions of all other participants. Of course, in return, each participant relinquishes some control over its own decisions. The extent to which decisions of one party support and reinforce the decisions of other parties is an important criterion for characterizing cooperative efforts (see C. Ellis, 1996 , for private sector examples).
The success of cooperation also depends on adherence to agreed-upon rules and norms. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) study how bargaining power affects cooperative behavior and, in particular, free rider behavior. In a related article, Fehr and Gachter (2000b) show that reciprocity serves as an important factor for the enforcement of con- Ellis's (1996) argument that cooperative agreements need to be nurtured and managed.
Cooperative efforts cover a wide range of projects and activities. This analysis is not concerned with short-term, one-time efforts dealing with simple issues or projects.
As Dewar and Isaac (1998) note, there is a tendency for implementation to be in a consultant mode when the project is a small part of the mandate or when the project is short term. Cooperation is easier (less threatening) when little is at stake. Short-term issues requiring collaborative efforts can often be handled by a temporary ad hoc task force with members representing the cooperating organizations (Mandell, 1999) . In this article, we are interested in sustained cooperative efforts that require a significant commitment of human and/or financial resources, which may take place over an extended period. Figure 1 summarizes the influence on the form of cooperation by the various dimensions of the cooperative effort. The compatibility of goals dimension relates to the correlation between the expected rewards of the participants and organizational culture (shared values and decision-making protocols). The coordination of decisions dimension reflects the extent to which the cooperators correlate their actions.
The commitment of resources dimension encompasses human, financial, and social capital.
The stronger the positive correlation between the expected rewards of participants, the stronger their incentive to coordinate their actions to mutual benefit (Gray, 1985, see particularly her Propositions 2, 3, and 6, pp. 921, 926) . When cooperation fails in spite of the existence of strong positive correlation between expected rewards, we have missed opportunities, and all potential participants are losers. One can think of a number of reasons cooperation does not exist. It is possible that the law keeps a government entity from cooperating. It is also possible that a private sector member does not understand, or lacks patience for, the decision-making process in the public sector. For example, the lack of confidentiality in the public sector may keep private sector members from cooperating with the public sector if they fear that such cooperation makes sensitive information available to competitors.
There are, of course, situations when the interests of different agents are mutually incompatible. Cooperation cannot persist in such situations, unless it is the result of coercion. Either agents will learn from their mistakes and change their behaviors or other agents who pursue their self-interests more successfully will displace them. Similarly, agents who fail to exploit the benefits from cooperation will eventually lose out to agents who pursue cooperative opportunities. In the remainder of this article, we will therefore limit our attention to situations characterized by mutually compatible interests.
Limiting exposure to risks is a powerful incentive for cooperation (e.g., Linder, 2000 In general, therefore, the most promising cooperative situations are those where rewards correlate positively with risks.
Public and Private Sector Differences
The dimensions presented in the previous section apply not only to public-private cooperative efforts but all cooperative efforts. However, there are unique characteristics of PPC that deserve our attention. Many of these characteristics are related to the different missions of private organizations compared to the missions of public organizations. The differences in the missions are also reflected in the way in which each organization is financed and governed, such as differences between bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations and entrepreneurial organizations with flatter decision-making structures. PPC is therefore different from cooperation between all public or all private entities. The following paragraphs enumerate important differences between public and private organizations (see also Withney, 1993) . For a perspective on PPC from the perspective of the private for-profit sector, see Austin and McCaffrey (2002 Another significant difference between the public sector and the private sector is the special powers of governmental organizations. Unlike the private sector, which relies on persuasion, the public sector can force compliance with its plans. The law and related policies, when followed, work to ensure that important government decisions are made in public and are subject to guidelines to ensure fairness, because powers of coercion can easily be abused. In the United States, many states have "sunshine laws"
that require discussions of important actions to be open to the public. The federal Freedom of Information Act is another indication of the importance assigned to sharing information with the public. Such information sharing and transparency are in marked contrast to decision making in the private sector, where business firms are reluctant to share information that could be used by competitors. The private sector's reluctance to share its business information and the public sector's legal obligation to make information public can lead to tension in economic development practice (for an example concerning conflict over the confidentiality of information, see "State Defends Secrecy,"
1996; "State Says Letting Public Know," 1995).
The legitimacy of governments comes from the support they enjoy among their citizens (e.g., Linder, 2000) . To maintain the citizens' confidence, public organizations have to be responsive to the needs and interests of all citizens and must provide opportunity for citizen input into the decision-making process. Thus, decisions made in public and the process are often slow and subject to competing interests.
The public sector may also be less vulnerable to financial risks than private organizations because of its exemption from certain forms of legal liability. Even when governments can be held liable, the extent of their financial liability is often limited. In addition, its sources of revenues are more stable because of the reliance on taxes. Customers can be fickle. Today's top product can be tomorrow's unwanted inventory, whereas citizens must pay their taxes year after year, whether they like the services they receive or not. However, the government's contributions to a PPC need not be financed from general revenues. In those cases, the government's sources of funds are probably as much subjected to uncertainty as the private partner's. The preceding paragraphs illustrate important philosophical and legal differences between private sector and public sector organizations. Such differences impose different constraints on PPC than those in private-private cooperation. However, it is exactly because of the differences between the public and the private sector that opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation arise. The two sectors have complementary powers, and thus, each can help the other accomplish things that may otherwise not be feasible. PPC initiatives may also serve to strengthen awareness and appreciation of diversity and interdependence as important organizational operating principles.
We should, however, heed the warning of Stone, Doherty, Jones, and Ross (1998) Cooperation between all-private participants also occurs because of their complementary capabilities, but differences amor-g them are usually less fundamental than those between the public and the private members in PPC.
Forms of PPC
Just as there is not one single best organizational form for private firms, there is not one single best form of PPC. What works best depends on the nature, scope, and risks of the projects. We therefore present four ideal-typical forms of PPC. We chose four forms to make broad distinctions because the smaller the difference between different forms of PPC, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish between them in practice. In this we are influenced by business law, which defines a small number of legal forms for businesses that cover a wide range of business activities and business cultures. And just as the law does not present one legal form of business organization as preferable to all others but offers them to meet different needs, we also do not recommend one form of PPC as best. The form of cooperation should be chosen to best fit the needs of the participants.
As discussed earlier, we define cooperation by the extent to which participants coordinate or correlate their decisions. Coordination can range from informal efforts to formal agreements, even to the complete merger of efforts. The ideal-typical forms presented here are compatible with the three types of collaboration activities presented in McGuire (2000): policy/strategy making, resource exchange, and project based.
LEADER-FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between leaders and followers can be interpreted as a form of cooperative behavior. It is often, though not always, an implicit form of cooperation, based on an understanding reached through experience. The leader-follower relationship is more likely to emerge over time from trial and error than as the result of negotia- Guinette Manor, the tenant association cooperated with a private company to compete for contracts from the housing authority. Cooperation with the tenant group gave the private company an edge, which it acknowledged through its agreement to be a minority stakeholder in the relationship. The HUD agency worked with the two organizations to provide.contract funds for training to improve -tenant skills (this example is drawn from Naparstek, Freis, & Kingsley, 2000) . HUD had the resources-in this case, funds-and served as the leader through its financing of the HOPE VI activities; the nonprofit tenant association and the private contractor were followers.
The leader-follower relationship is a widely used form of PPC. For example, a government wishing to redevelop an area will often assume a leadership role by making important up-front infrastructure investments with the expectation that private sector investments will follow. An initial government investment may be necessary to reduce the risk of private investments. If only one private property owner makes improvements in a run-down neighborhood, the value of his or her investment is reduced by the poor state of the other properties (negative externalities).
A classic example of this kind of investment strategy is tax increment financing, in which local government in effect mortgages future property tax revenue increases to make land improvements, attracting private sector investments, which in turn create the increased property tax revenue (for more detail on tax increment financing, see Dougherty & Loveridge, 1998) . A well-known example of tax increment financing is the case of Bloomington, Minnesota, which used the technique to set the stage for the construction of the Mall of America-the largest mall in the United States. One could question whether this qualifies as a cooperative effort. We believe that it does because governments must learn about and be responsive to the goals and objectives of the private sector or the investments in infrastructure will be wasted. If the initial investment is large and/or very risky, the government agency considering the investment will usually discuss its plans with private sector organizations first, to ascertain the likelihood that they will follow its lead. To encourage potential followers, the government may also offer incentives. Such incentives may not be aimed at any specific organization but be available to anyone who meets the government's criteria. An example of this kind of incentive is the "enterprise zone" policy in which companies locating in highpoverty areas receive selected tax reductions or special access to government contracts. Incentives that are targeted to a specific organization may not fall under the leader-follower relationship but under one of the other forms of PPC discussed in this article, particularly the seller-buyer relationship, discussed below. Hopkins and Schaeffer (1983) (Mayes, 2000) .
EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS (SELLER-BUYER RELATIONSHIPS)
In a voluntary exchange, both sellers and buyers are better off at the end of action. They coordinate their decisions, although the extent to which this happens can differ greatly. In the case of standardized goods and services, no explicit cooperation is necessary between individual buyers and individual sellers (low transactions costs, anonymous exchange process), and market intermediaries take care of coordinating the exchange. In economic development, however, services and goods exchanged between the private sector and the public sector (up-front infrastructure investments, financial incentives, commitment to create given numbers and types of jobs, etc.) are often complex and nonstandardized, and significant coordination between buyer and seller is necessary (high transaction costs), requiring face-to-face negotiations. Thus, this type of relationship fits the characteristics of a cooperative relationship (for a theory of buyer-seller networks as a relationship, see Kranton & Minehart, 2001 ).
Many of the cases of the private provision of public services fall under the heading of exchange relationships, with the public sector and the private sector working together over a long period. In many such cases, citizens continue to hold the public sector responsible for service quality. For example, when local governments contract with private firms to provide public transportation, the public will address complaints to the local government, and the government and contractor must work cooperatively to address grievances and correct problems. An example of this exists in Monongalia County, West Virginia, where public transportation is provided by a private subcontractor, but government hears citizens' complaints and brings them to the attention of the subcontractor. For more on PPC in transportation, see Dunn (2000) .
Another example is the provision of prisons by private contractors (e.g., Mattera, Communities and/or states competing against each other (e.g., Haider, 1992; Hanson, 1993) for new businesses andjobs can also be regarded as sellers and the businesses as buyers. Each community offers a set of location attributes (infrastructure, labor force, amenities) at a certain "price" (effective tax rates and user charges, start-up subsidies). The main purpose of a community usually is to recruit a firm and keep it in the community; beyond this, additional long-termjoint projects with the recruited firm are rare. This is more similar to a seller-buyer relationship than to any of the other Describing industrial recruitment as an exchange relationship is accurate because it captures the most relevant characteristics of such efforts. In particular, it calls attention to the price at which the exchange takes placeand to the fact that there may be both competing sellers and other potential buyers. The public sector is not always the seller.
In some instances, the private sector attempts "to sell" a community or region on the idea of accepting certain types of facilities, such as a garbage incinerator or paper mill.
Although both seller and buyer benefit from their interaction, there is also an obvious element of competition between them over the terms of the exchange. The simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is not unique to this form of relationship but may be less apparent in the other relationships described in this article.
JOINT VENTURES
The term joint venture is common in practice but is usually described as a special form of a public-private partnership, another indication that partnership is used to describe a wide range of different forms of PPC (e.g., UNISON, n.d.). Joint venture has a clear meaning in private industry, and our use of the term is based on that meaning.
A joint venture is a useful vehicle if two or more participants expect to gain from working closely together on a specific issue or project but otherwise wish to keep their independence from each other (e.g., Bean, 1995 When public goods and services are important to private interests, we sometimes find that private organizations request and support their provision by offering to cooperate with the responsible government agency. An example of this is the development of the first zoning ordinance of Aspen, Colorado, which was initiated and partly financed by the Aspen Institute (Clifford, 1980) . This nonprofit organization was interested in preserving Aspen's character as a former mining town and in preserving the value of its investments, and it therefore worked cooperatively with the town to guide the process of developing the zoning ordinance.
Joint ventures have also become more common in higher education, for example, in the development or improvement of a sophisticated product. To this end, a private company may give away a patent to a research university and help fund the further development of the technology in return for rights to the results from the research.
Typically in joint ventures, interested businesses and the government each agree to take certain actions and investments. A joint venture is particularly appropriate when the initial risk of a public investment is high without the assurance that private investments will follow. By seeking coinvestors in a joint venture, the parties involved can reduce their risks to an acceptable level (e.g., Stainback, 2000) . We call such projects joint ventures because, first, although important decisions and actions will be coordi- Peters (1998) , with the exception that we put more emphasis on the open-ended nature of a partnership, whereas Beauregard sees them as serving a specific purpose. Peters has a somewhat broader view of their purpose: "Rather, in a partnership there is a continuing relationship, the parameters of which are negotiated among the members from the outset" (p. 13). Peters stresses that in a partnership, all participants can act on its behalf; that a partnership is "enduring" (p. 13); that all partners bring something into the partnership; and that they share responsibility for the success of the partnership. Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000b) similarly argues that "authentic partnering, in theory, involves close collaboration and the combination of strengths of both the private sector (more competitive and efficient) and the public sector (responsibility and accountability vis-'a-vis society)" (p. 219).
Linder (2000) defines partnerships not by looking at their characteristics but by considering their benefits. He argues that public-private partnerships can be used as a tool to achieve management reform, either by changing managerial practices or by changing the nature of a problem so that it can attract a private for-profit partner. A public-private partnership may also change the perception of the public that is being served. Public services are often taken for granted, whereas a service proved by a mixed public-private entity may be viewed differently. Linder also stresses the benefits of "risk shifting" (p. 29).
In an ideal-typical partnership, all partners share in the rewards and decision making and assume full responsibility for the risks of their joint activities (see also Beauregard, 1998, pp. 53-54) . We refer to this as a full partnership. In a limited partnership, not all partners share equally in the risks and rewards. The limited partners reduce their exposure to financial risks to an agreed-upon amount, whereas the unlimited partners are liable with their full faith and credit. For a partnership to exist, at least one partner must be an unlimited partner.
The National Child Care Partnership Project's definition is similar to ours: "A public-private partnership exists when the public sector-federal, state, local and/or tribal officials or agencies-joins with the private sector-families, employers, philanthropies, media, civic groups, and/or service providers-to attain a shared goal" (National Child Care Information Center, 2000) . The further description also stresses the importance of the partnership's ability "to change in response to emerging needs and to take advantage of new opportunities"; finally, "decision-making and management responsibilities are shared among the partners" (National Child Care Information Center, 2000) , that is, a partnership's open-ended nature.
Based on our observations and reading of the literature and popular press, we believe that public-private partnerships are relatively rare. This should not surprise anyone. The demands of an ideal-typical partnership are significant. As Gray (1985) This content downloaded from 157.182.147.226 on Thu, 18 Oct 2018 18:49:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms implies, long-term cooperation is more difficult and requires more structure than short-term cooperative efforts. All partners participate in decision making and share all risks with their full faith and credit. No wonder that the business partnership is not the dominant organizational form in the private sector. We believe that the demands of a partnership also work to make public-private partnerships relatively scarce. Therefore, long-term relationships are more likely to form when there exists a "high degree of ongoing interdependence." Gray (p. 918) and Rubin and Stankiewicz (2001) provide case studies of the Los Angeles Community Development Bank and argue that it failed because not all of the conditions of a full partnership were met. They use Peters's (1998) definition of a public-private partnership. As mentioned above, this definition is very closely related to ours.
An example of a public-private partnership in the university context is the licensing agreement. Increasingly, universities are willing to take equity positions in a start-up company that may not be financially able to pay licensing fees for university-held patents. The university forgoes potential revenues by granting an exclusive license, whereas the private start-up company owners risk their capital.
Workforce development boards are examples of a federal government-private sector partnership. The federal government creates these boards, but the majority of the board members are representing for-profit entities. These boards approve private sector and public sector training that is funded by federal dollars. The federal government seeks private sector partners to ensure that its training dollars go into programs needed by the private sector.
The Downtown Denver Partnership (DDP), the Minnesota Business Partnership (http://www.mnbp.com/), and the Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development (Metzger, 1998) are other examples of successful public-private partnerships.
The purpose of these partnerships when they were founded was broad and open ended. A close partnership between the public sector and the private sector is not without risk. Sometimes, community government and business get together and decide what to do that serves their self-interests-while trying to avoid public input. An example of such an occurrence is described in a case study in Reese and Rosenfeld (2001 weaker form (see Cigler, 1999) . Cooperation is not static but a process that changes over time. As participants gain experience working together successfully, they buil mutual trust that permits them to take on riskier projects, make bigger commitments and work together more closely. C. Ellis (1996) and Wiewel and Lieber (1998) also stress the importance of trust in a partnership; Gray (1985) should not assume that a PPC remains unchanged over time (see also Ferguson, 1998 p. 593, Figure 13 -1). The appropriate form of PPC depends on the distribution of risks and expected rewards. We assume that expected rewards are positive for both participants becau B's greater exposure to risks is likely to lead to the pursuit of a different investment strategy than that most preferred by A. Thus, they may not be able to make joint decisions. Even if joint decision making is not achievable, however, they may be able to accomplish a less demanding form of cooperation. fore less concerned about sharing information with the public. Because they obtained their tax-exempt status in return for a commitment to some public interest, they are also philosophically closer to government than private for-profit businesses. In other words, NGOs combine characteristics of public and of private for-profit organizations.
This makes them potential partners for the public sector, particularly in the area of policy partnerships (Lovrich, 2000) . Hula, Jackson, and Orr (1997) argue that "broad collective interests exist that are not adequately represented in current governing regimes" and that NGOs "can serve as a viable platform for the aggregation of collective interests, including under represented interests" (p. 460). In other words, NGOs often serve as effective coalition builders and policy initiators (Hula & Jackson-Elmoore, 2001 
Conclusions
We are concerned that the widespread use of the term public-private partnership hides important differences between different forms of PPC and that the emotional connotation of the term partnership conveys an image of egalitarian and conflict-free decision making. Differences between the public sector and the private sector (e.g., their conflicting organizational cultures) make it likely that conflicts of interest exist.
Such conflicts are to be expected and need not prevent mutually beneficial cooperation. Their inclusion in the analysis is important for an understanding of the nature of PPC, however.
The term partner is used for a spouse or climbing, tennis, or dancing partner. In these contexts, the term conveys the existence of mutual trust, complete interdependence, and shared goals. In the United States, the term partnership also has a clear legal meaning (e.g., Steffen, 1977) . In a full legal partnership, all partners back the enterprise with their full faith and credit, whereas in a limited partnership, the risks (and rewards) are unevenly distributed. Finally, the term partner (and partnership) implies an egalitarian relationship between participants. Public and private organizations have such different powers and capabilities that in most situations, it is difficult to perceive them as equals. Cooperators often fall into the trap of being co-opted or feeling a loss of authority as the PPC develops, signaling a need to renegotiate or end the PPC.
Although other forms of PPC are common, public-private partnerships, as defined in this article, rarely form. An ideal-typical partnership makes high demands on the partners in terms of their commitment of resources, coordination of decision making, and exposure to risks. A looser form of cooperation that better protects all participants may be preferable when there are significant differences of exposure to risks and/or conflicts of interest between participants. In other words, none of the four forms of PPC presented in this article is considered to be inherently superior to the others. The form of the PPC should be chosen to fit the characteristics and needs of the participants and of the common purpose. The review of the literature shows that there is no agreement as to the precise m ing of the phrase public-private partnership. Some use the term in a narrow sense to describe the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the provision of public services and infrastructure, whereas others use it to describe a multitude of cooperative activities. Maybe this situation exists because different disciplinesbusiness, economics, law, planning, political science, and public administration-that do not always use the same terminology have investigated PPC. Analytical approaches in these disciplines also differ and range from empirical case studies to theoretical models using game theory (for an application of game theory to the study of exchange relationships in local economic development, see S. Ellis & Rogers, 2000) .
This article provides a vocabulary for a more precise description and differentiated analysis of PPCs. We defined four forms of PPC, based on the degree to which the par- In summary, this article is a step toward a better understanding of PPCs. Its contribution is in providing a vocabulary and classification system that can be used by those who study PPC in action. The results of future work could lead to a refinement of the classification system presented here.
